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I argue that nonlocal decision of the outcomes at detection excludes any alternative theory to
quantum mechanics: Not all that matters for the results of physical experiments is content in
space-time, but all that is in space-time is accessible to observation.
An experiment demonstrating single-photon nonlocal
decision of outcome at detection has been presented and
discussed in [1, 2]. This experiment highlights that the
standard quantum mechanics (also called the Copen-
hagen or orthodox interpretation) is actually character-
ized by the following two principles:
Principle A: All that is in space-time is accessible to
observation, unless in case of space-like separation.
Principle Q : Not all that matters for the physical phe-
nomena is content in space-time.
Alternative theories assume decision at the beam split-
ter and deny these two Principles A and Q.
In the follow I show that nonlocal decision at detection
allow us to falsify alternative theories in a natural and
uncomplicated way.
The “collapse of the wave function”.—A quantum
experiment always consists of a device (beam-splitter,
polarizer, Stern-Gerlach, etc.) exhibiting at least two
output ports, each of them monitored by a correspond-
ing detector. With this experimental configuration, after
leaving the source a “classical” particle can reach each
detector by two different paths.
Interference experiments are paramount in quantum
mechanics. Consider the experiment sketched in Figure
1 using a Mach-Zehnder interferometer. For calculating
the counting rates of each detector one must take into ac-
count information about the two paths leading from the
laser source to the detector (wave behavior). However,
with a single-photon source only one of the two detec-
tors clicks: either D(1) or D(0) (particle behavior : “one
photon, one count”, or conservation of energy).
If a ∈ {+1,−1} labels the detection values according
to whether D(1) or D(0) clicks, the probability of getting
a is given by:
P (a) =
1
2
(1 + a cosΦ) (1)
where Φ = ωτ is the phase parameter and τ = l−sc the
optical path.
By changing the phase parameter Φ (for instance by
enlarging the length of path l) on gets different statistical
distributions of the outcomes. Equal phases (mod. 2pi)
define the same quantum state and yield the same distri-
bution; different phases define different quantum states
and yield different distributions, and different distribu-
tions correspond to different phases and quantum states.
FIG. 1: Interference experiment: Laser light of frequency ω
emitted by the source enters an interferometer through beam-
splitter (half-silvered mirror) BS0 and gets detected after leav-
ing beam-splitter BS1. The light can reach each of the detec-
tors D(1) and D(0) by the paths l and s; the path-length l
can be changed by the experimenter.
To explain interferences the standard interpretation in-
vokes the “collapse of the wave function”. This rather
cryptic expression means nothing other than the decision
of the outcomes happens at detection. The “collapse”
disposes of trajectories and is tacitly nonlocal [2].
“Collapse” vs determinism.—Determinism is the
view assuming Principle A and rejecting Principle Q.
Determinism necessarily excludes any choice, specially
free choice on the part of the experimenter: Otherwise
(in the experiment of Figure 1) the experimenter could
access information about which of the two paths (l or
s) the particles takes after leaving BS0, and thwart the
interference changing the other path. And even if one as-
sumes that accessing which path information demolishes
the particle, the experimenter could thwart interference
according to the Equation (1) by choosing to change ei-
ther path l or path s at will after the particle leaves BS0.
In the context of spin experiments, determinism is
proved to conflict with quantum mechanics by the
Kochen-Specker theorem [3], unless one accepts that the
particle’s properties depend on the particular set of mea-
surements the experimenter decides to perform (contex-
tuality).
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2In summary, determinism leads to superdeterminism:
In interference experiments (Figure 1), the experimenter
is contrived by nature to change the same path the parti-
cle takes at BS0, or alternatively the experimenter’s path
choice has back-ward effects determining the particle’s
path, and similarly for other properties.
“Collapse” vs locality.—Assumed free choice, to ex-
plain interference one could in principle invoke a local
version of standard quantum mechanics, by assuming de-
cision at detection but excluding coordination between
the detectors faster than light. In this sense this lo-
cal version does not assume hidden variables. It has
now been experimentally falsified by the experiment pre-
sented in [1, 2], which thereby demonstrates the tacit
nonlocality involved in the “collapse” in the context of
single-particle experiments. Note that violation of Bell’s
inequalities cannot be implemented in such experiments
to prove nonlocality [2].
Alternative theories.—These are explanations, assum-
ing decision at the beam-splitter and rejecting both Prin-
ciples A and Q. Alternative theories assume accessible
and inaccessible local hidden variables and are sort of
hybrids of the standard interpretation and the determin-
istic one. One can distinguish two types:
Type I : Models yielding the same predictions as quan-
tum mechanics, like Louis de Broglie’s picture of the
“empty wave”. After leaving a beam-splitter, the acces-
sible particle travels always a well defined trajectory (say
path l in Figure 1), and the inaccessible “empty wave”
(without energy and momentum) propagates through the
alternative path (path s in Figure 1). In single-particle
experiments the explanation escapes nonlocality at de-
tection.
As far as one wishes to maintain locality, the explana-
tion would conflict with quantum mechanics in 2-particle
entanglement experiments, as proved by John Bell [4].
Nonetheless, the model can be extended to account for
the quantum nonlocal correlations as well. To this aim
the “empty wave” was supplemented by David Bohm
with a “nonlocal quantum potential”, and the so im-
proved description yields the same predictions as the
standard view in entanglement experiments with 2 or
more particles (4 or more detectors) [4].
Type II : Models deviating from quantum mechanics.
The three following have received extended attention:
- Eberhard : assumes finite-speed causal influences
propagating faster than light at a velocity v (c < v <∞)
supposed to define a new constant of nature. The nonlo-
cal coordination between the beam-splitters is supposed
to break down when their separation is large enough ([5]
and References therein).
- Suarez-Scarani : assumes relativistic time-ordered
nonlocal influences. The nonlocal correlations disappear
when the beam-splitters are in a state of movement cor-
responding to a before-before relativistic configuration
([6, 7] and References therein).
These two models include well defined experimental
protocols leading to the disappearance of the nonlocal
influences under certain conditions and thereby to local
parts. The deviation from quantum mechanics is an ax-
iom (to be tested), and not a theorem.
- Leggett : combines as well nonlocal influences and lo-
cal parts ([8] and References therein) but (contrarily to
Suarez-Sacarani and Eberhard) Leggett does not explain
how the experimenter can thwart the nonlocal coordina-
tion in order to produce a set of local parts. The model
pretends that deviation from quantum mechanics is not
included in the main assumptions, but results as a theo-
rem.
Suarez-Sacarani and Eberhard have been tested and
falsified by experiment [5–7]. More recently it has been
proved that these two models lead to communication
faster-than-light [9, 10].
Leggett has been ruled out by experiment ([11] and
References therein). Notice however that this experiment
does not refer to models assuming time-ordered nonlocal
influences (like Bohm, Suarez-Sacarani, and Eberhard)
and therefore is not supposed to falsify these models. In
this sense the experiment cannot be considered “a com-
plete answer to the question [...] of whether quantum
mechanics is the optimal way to predict measurement
outcomes.” [11]
Obviously, nonlocal alternative theories are no longer
motivated by the wish of avoiding nonlocality. So the
question arises why one still keeps to decision at the
beam-splitter. The only plausible answer seems to be:
to maintain trajectories and explain the outcomes in a
deterministic way. But this is at odds with the incorpo-
ration of the free choice assumption, necessary to rule out
locality. In this sense all the alternative theories have to
be considered self-contradictory, unless they are suscep-
tible of reformulation under the assumption of nonlocal
decision at detection.
“Many worlds” and “parallel lives”.—The self-
contradictory nature of the alternatives to quantum me-
chanics assuming hidden variables (i.e., rejecting the
Principles A and Q) is brought blatantly to light through
the “many worlds” and “parallel lives” pictures.
Regarding “many worlds” Jon Bell said:
“The ’many world interpretation’ seems to me an ex-
travagant, and above all an extravagantly vague, hypoth-
esis. I could also dismiss it as silly. And yet... It may
have something distinctive to say in connection with the
’Einstein Podolsky Rosen puzzle’, and it would be worth-
while, I think, to formulate some precise version of it to
see if this is really so.” ([4] p. 194).
Work by Lev Vaidman [14], and more recently by Gilles
Brassard and Paul Raymond-Robichaud [15], shows that
“many worlds” has really something distinctive to say
3in connection with the “EPR puzzle”: Refutation of lo-
cal hidden variables (by the violation of Bell’s inequali-
ties or other means) doesn’t mean refutation of locality.
By assuming decision at the beam splitter you become
a “strong Faithful” of the “Church of the Large Hilbert
Space” [15], because (without even realizing it) you pro-
fess rejection of both Principle A and Principle B, and
this rejection is the main article of the “many worlds”
faith. Hence you will not have the necessary mental
strength to reject locality.
It is not possible to keep decision at the beam split-
ter and nonlocality while rejecting “many worlds” in the
name of freedom [2]:
Decision at the beam-splitters & Nonlocality
=⇒ Determinism
What is more, any free choice comes from outside
space-time to some extent. If decision of the beam-
splitter is motivated by the desire of “localizing” the
choice within space-time in order to deny Principle Q,
then the consequent attitude is to assume that there is
no choice at all, that is “many worlds”.
In summary, it is not by its own strength that “many
worlds” lives, but by the weakness of its objectors.
By contrast if you assume nonlocal decision at de-
tection you profess both Principle A and Principle B,
and, therefore, you remain outside the Church of “many
worlds” and will be able of opposing this interpretation
without contradicting yourself. And you can also consis-
tently reject superdeterminism for freedom’s sake.
Uncomplicated confutation of alternative theo-
ries.—The previous analysis shows that strictly speak-
ing Bell-type experiments demonstrate nonlocality only
as far as one assumes decision at detection. One can
certainly say that such experiments have demonstrated
nonlocality between Alice’s and Bob’s detections. But it
is also true that the detection loophole is not yet closed.
By contrast one can say that the experiment in [1, 2]
demonstrates nonlocality in a more straightforward way,
and (as discussed in [2]) without loopholes. Additionally,
this experiment demonstrates that without nonlocality
we could not have the most fundamental principle ruling
the material world, the conservation of energy. Quan-
tum physics has certainly to do with information, but
fortunately also with physics.
Consider now what become the alternative theories un-
der assumption of decision at detection:
The de Broglie-Bohm theory converts obviously into
standard quantum mechanics.
As regards theories predicting disappearance of the
nonlocal influences (Eberhard, Suarez-Scarani, and
Leggett), they lead to violation of the conservation of
energy in each single quantum event and are falsified by
the experiment presented in [1, 2] in a direct and uncom-
plicated way.
It is interesting to see that all these three models pre-
dict distributions depending on parameters other than
the quantum mechanical phase values (like the parame-
ter Φ in Figure 1). In this sense they assume that a same
quantum state can share two different distributions, and
two different quantum states can share a same distri-
bution, and can be considered representatives of the so
(equivocally) called “statistical interpretation” [12, 13].
If one assumes decision at detection, the “statistical in-
terpretation” amounts to assume nonlocality at detection
together with at least two different distributions of detec-
tion outcomes depending on some (undefined) detector’s
characteristic (for instance in the experiment of Figure
1). Therefore, by switching from one distribution to the
other, one could signal from one detector to the other
faster than light.
“More nonlocal” than quantum mechan-
ics?—What about possible alternatives that are more
nonlocal than quantum mechanics and fulfill the no-
signaling condition?
In [18] it has been showed that the “quantum alge-
bra” can be derived from three axioms with clear physi-
cal content: free will, conservation of energy, and locality
emergent from nonlocality at detection. As far as one ac-
cepts these three axioms one has to accept Equation (1)
and exclude more nonlocality than Bell’s one. Addition-
ally if one keeps in mind that nonlocality at detection in
single-particle experiments is the basic form of nonlocal-
ity, it is not clear what “more nonlocal” may mean in
this context.
Can quantum mechanics be improved?—Does
the previous conclusions mean that quantum mechanics
is the ultimate theory and will not experience any further
improvement in the future? Not by any means. Quan-
tum physics has still to solve for instance the so called
“measurement problem” (Schro¨dinger cat paradox).
A reason for the little attention payed to nonlocality
at detection so far, may be reluctance towards the “sub-
jective” interpretation of the “collapse” as requiring the
presence of a conscious observer. However, I would like
to stress that it is possible to have a view combining the
“subjective” aspect of Copenhagen and the “objective”
one of GRW’s “spontaneous collapse” [16] or Penroses
“objective reduction” [17].
In fact, for measurement to happen it is not neces-
sary at all that a human observer (conscious or not) is
watching the apparatuses. However the very definition
of measurement makes relation to human consciousness:
An event is “measured”, i.e. irreversibly registered, only
if the objective conditions are fulfilled allowing a human
observer to become aware of the registration.
In a sense I consider the “collapse” to be something
as objective as “death”, which physicians define as the
irreversible breakdown of all the brain functions includ-
ing brainstem ones. For someone to die (generally) it is
4not necessary to be watched by some conscious physi-
cian. However the conditions defining “death” relate to
the limit of the human capabilities to reverse a process
of decay.
Even if measurement is basic to quantum mechan-
ics, for the moment the theory does not define the
conditions determining when the outcome gets irre-
versibly registered and measurement happens (certainly,
medicine does not achieve better in defining when pre-
cisely “death” happens). Ascertaining these conditions
is to date an unsolved (but solvable) problem (“measure-
ment problem”). This state of affairs clearly shows a
point where quantum theory, as we know it today, can
and must be completed. And to do it, it may be that we
have to understand better how consciousness and free will
happen in the brain. I am convinced that the solution of
this problem will bestow us a theory more fundamental
than quantum mechanics, but not a more nonlocal one,
or one renouncing to decision at detection.
Conclusion.—In 1997, together with Valerio Scarani,
I proposed the before-before experiment, which became
realized in 2001 [7]. The people, my co-workers, were
wonderful and the work was for sure enjoyable. However
I wonder now why I proposed the before-before (and ex-
pended considerable work, time and money to do it) in-
stead of proposing and doing the conceptually far more
important and technically much less challenging experi-
ment that I proposed in 2010 and has been done in the
past months [1, 2]. A possible explanation may be that
the new experiment is important not only because it is
about nonlocality, but primarily because it demonstrates
that nonlocality is crucial for the conservation of energy.
To reach this insight, which now seems trivial to me, it
was probably necessary to be defeated by quantum me-
chanics (in the field of the before-before) after having
very much expected to beat it. Now I really understand
how important decision at detection is.
The new experiment is also significant because it al-
low us to distinguish sharply quantum mechanics from
alternative theories: If one ignores “nonlocal decision at
detection”, then the task of refuting alternative theories
is rather complicate; if one assumes it, then the task
seems rather trivial. Decision at the beam-splitter, or at
detection, that is the question.
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